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Conflict, Complexity, and Cooperation 
 
John, Lord Alderdice 
Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford 
 
Abstract  
This article explores the thesis that we are at a time of historical inflection and suggests what 
next steps might look like. The change in the seat of authority from the sixteenth century on 
with the replacement of political and religious hierarchies by participatory democracy and 
Enlightenment philosophies based on rationalism has seen a remarkable period of progress in 
science, technology, education, medicine, governance, trade, economics, and the rule of law. 
The twenty-first century, however, has ushered in a series of reversals for liberal democracy, 
the fraying of the international rules-based order that emerged after the two world wars and a 
collapse of public confidence in the institutions and methods based on the rationalist approach. 
The article suggests that the old forms are dissolving and that the time has come for the 
emergence of a new paradigm and proposes that three developments may point toward the next 
evolutionary way station: the emergence of complexity science, an appreciation that our 
emotions are a positive evolutionary advantage rather than a flaw to be overcome, and a focus 
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Liberals and progressives, no less than the population at large, have in recent times been 
experiencing a roller coaster of expectations, emotions, and reactions to challenging political 
developments, both national and global. Most people who grew up in Europe and in the United 
States in the past two or three generations were used to a postwar world on a continuous 
trajectory of economic improvement, physical security, and increasing freedom and 
democracy. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, they were joined by 
the citizens of states from the old Soviet bloc, South Asia, Latin America, and parts of Africa, 
which were also becoming more democratic, stable, prosperous, peaceful, and relatively free. 
It seemed that we might be moving into a new era, characterized by the more rational conduct 
of global affairs and where people were protected by the adoption and implementation of 
human rights instruments governing not only civil and political affairs but social and economic 
development too. Liberal democracy and the capitalist economic model seemed to have won 
the day, demonstrating and affirming the validity of the principles that had emerged from the 
Enlightenment. Not everyone went quite as far as Francis Fukuyama, who argued that the 
global spread of liberal democracy and free market capitalism may signal the end point of 
humanity’s sociocultural evolution and be the ultimate form of human government.1 Many 
certainly believed, however, that we were far along a linear process of evolutionary 
development and that progress is based on human reason.  
There had been earlier shocks to this optimistic interpretation of history and its trajectory, 
notably the two global conflicts of the first half of the twentieth century. The involvement of 
Germany in the prosecution of war, and more especially in the Holocaust, despite its impressive 
educational system and its history of thought and culture, was especially troubling. Germans 
had been important contributors to the political and intellectual liberalism and rationalism that 
emerged in previous centuries through the Reformation and the Enlightenment. Faith in human 
reason had led to extraordinary progress in science and technology and would continue to do 
so, not least in medicine, transport, and communication; but that confidence had experienced a 
profound setback. Enlightenment thinkers had expected that a few generations of popular 
literacy and rational education would be sufficient to curb human aggression and violence and 
would ensure the peaceful and stable progress of humanity. The First World War put a serious 
question mark against those optimistic assumptions. Sigmund Freud, who described himself as 
“a liberal of the old school,”2 was so affected by the terrible events of the war that he 
dramatically altered his theoretical model, introducing the notion of the death instinct and 
responding in a rather pessimistic way to Albert Einstein’s invitation to suggest ways of 
preventing future wars.3 
Initially most political observers hoped that the problems that had led to Germany’s 
engaging in such destruction could be addressed by the application of more democratic 
principles. If human rationality had not contained human aggression, surely it was a problem 
of the old imperial order, and new national democratic constitutions along with institutions of 
international cooperation would prevent a recurrence. The application of human rationality to 
governance in Germany’s new Weimar Republic, however, and international cooperation 
through the League of Nations did not resolve the problem, and despite improvements in the 
management and infrastructure of Germany, inflation grew to catastrophic levels and was 
accompanied by a rise in political extremism that resulted in a second and in some ways even 
more appalling and widespread global conflict. 
As the Second World War came to a close, leading figures in Europe and the United States 
were forced to recognize that education and rationality applied to socioeconomic and political 
development had not prevented the disastrous violence of two world wars, and so they proposed 
a more robust international rules-based approach in the hope that it might succeed.  





The League of Nations was replaced by the United Nations, bringing countries together 
around the table but with a special role for the victorious powers in its central governing body, 
the United Nations Security Council. The creation of the Bretton Woods institutions addressed 
the economic challenges that had been held responsible for at least some of the interwar 
instability. The purpose of the Nuremberg trials was not only to allow the vengeance of the 
victors but also to make clear that there would in the future be no impunity for “crimes against 
humanity” that were not excusable even in times of all-out war. And more important, a new 
secular code of global “commandments” was set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR). The thirty articles of the declaration start with a statement of belief in Article 
1 that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” followed by the 
insistence that “they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.” But the UDHR recognizes that the freedom and dignity that 
every individual should be able to enjoy depends on human rationality and on conscience and 
a spirit of brotherhood. That moral imperative and fraternal spirit had failed in Europe for a 
catastrophic second time in less than a generation. It was becoming clear that the human rights 
that had been declared by the humanists and liberals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
could not be guaranteed merely by an appeal to a rational moral conscience. So the UDHR, 
adopted by the United Nations in 1948, was imbedded in an international rules–based system 
with new international institutions that it was hoped would ensure its full implementation.4 
The decades that followed gave some grounds for optimism that humanity had learned its 
lesson and that a new age had begun, guided by universal values that went beyond religion, 
nationality, politics, and culture. The hope was that this new body of international law based 
on human rights and grounded in postwar multinational institutions would ensure the 
development of a global culture of lawfulness. International courts began to hold to account 
those found guilty of crimes against humanity. Countries that had been former enemies over 
many centuries came together, first in Europe and then in other regions, to form transnational 
unions cooperating on economic, legal, cultural, scientific, and political challenges, as well as 
the emerging global threats to health and the environment. Real progress was made on tackling 
infectious diseases and reducing poverty and hunger. The end of the Cold War saw serious 
efforts to reduce the stockpiles of nuclear weapons and limit their further proliferation to new 
states. To some, especially liberals in the West, it really began to look as though a new golden 
age was dawning. 
It was therefore a profound shock for many people to see all this change in recent years 
with the rise of transnational terrorism, religious fundamentalism, extreme nationalism, and a 
slide into deepening racial and ethnic divisions and violent political conflict throughout the 
world. Questions about what creates and sustains intractable violent political conflict and how 
it may be possible to find ways out of it returned with an urgency not seen for decades. 
Prosperity was replaced by austerity and for the first time a generation of young people had to 
adjust to the expectation that they would likely have a lower standard of living than their 
parents. Every previous generation had expected to build on the success of those who went 
before, but now many young people would struggle to own their own homes, and almost all 
would have to work longer before retiring with lower pensions. This generation in most 
countries around the world are less confident than their parents were about the adequacy and 
quality of the public provision of education, health care, and social care. Pollution, catastrophic 
climate change, and other environmental threats are on the rise, and the high hopes for a new 
world order after the end of the Cold War have given way to profound anxiety with the rise of 
Islamist and white right extremism and terrorist attacks. The security responses of the “War on 
Terror” have not resulted in a more stable world, and instead we have an increasing number of 
fragile or failing states. The new models of international cooperation at a regional level, most 
notably the postwar European Project, seem to be struggling against a public mood of 





skepticism and even disenchantment. The departure of the United Kingdom from the European 
Union after almost half a century of membership is an important example of how decades of 
expansion of liberal democracy have given way to political fragmentation and the return of 
populism and nationalism in Europe. But this drift is mirrored on every other continent too, 
and liberals are deeply anxious about it.5 
Faced with such reversals of fortune, many liberals who would normally try to reflect with 
some objectivity on the root causes of political challenges find themselves, like everyone else, 
driven by feelings of fear and anger, becoming intolerant of different perspectives and blaming 
those with whom they disagree for being responsible for these disappointing and frightening 
changes. What many of my colleagues do not see is that by conducting the debate in somewhat 
belligerent tones, they are contributing to the polarization and profound partisanship that now 
deform our political discourse rather than promoting reflection, conversation, and inclusive 
engagement of the whole community in understanding our dilemmas and how they can be 
addressed in new ways. 
Under such pressures, the natural human response is to turn inward and focus on one’s 
own domestic circumstances, so, for example, Democrats (and some Republicans) in the 
United States, distressed by the 2016 election and subsequent performance of President Donald 
Trump, focused on him and the methods that his campaign (and some external players) 
employed to get him elected and on how close or unrepresentative that election result actually 
was. They concentrated, successfully, on ensuring that he was not re-elected in 2020, but the 
result was not an overwhelming victory; instead, it demonstrated that the United States, like so 
many other liberal democracies, is split down the middle and the questions must still be asked, 
“What has happened to cause such a large percentage of white Americans to turn away from 
the Democratic offer and vote for such a person? How can it be that liberal democracy can 
result in such an outcome when people know with great clarity what they are voting for?” The 
psychoanalyst Ed Shapiro in a recent book says that the lesson he has learned from a lifetime 
of engaging with such issues is that he needs always to ask the question, “What is the other guy 
right about?”6 
This, however, is not just an American problem. We must reflect on the fact that similar 
swings of fortune are seen in almost every part of the world, with populists, demagogues, and 
nationalists rising to prominence almost everywhere. Unlike a previous generation of leaders 
such as Mikhail Gorbachev, Nelson Mandela, F. W. de Klerk, Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, 
Bill Clinton, and George Mitchell, who believed that the job of a statesman was to resolve 
conflicts, today’s leaders look for greatness in conducting conflicts, domestically and 
internationally. Whatever has occasioned this change in the global community, it is not merely 
about the conduct of politics in one jurisdiction. There is a worldwide shift. People of every 
age and stage also seem to feel increasingly distant and alienated from all institutions of 
governance—whether national government, regional structures such as in the European Union, 
or the postwar international rules-based order as represented by the United Nations, the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the World Health 
Organization. The legitimacy of these structures is questioned, and one hears constant 
complaints that they are not operating in the interests of ordinary people and that they are 
ineffective, not only taking military actions under dubious mandates but unable to justify them 
by subsequently bringing these interventions to a satisfactory conclusion—one of the 
requirements of the doctrine of the “just war.” The wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria 
have resulted in widespread chaos and lawlessness that is also reaching beyond the borders of 
these failing states, with enormous costs in the destruction of life and property and with no 
successful end in sight. 
There is also anger about what is perceived as gross inequity and corruption in the financial 
system. The assumption, and the promise, that abandoning socialism and adopting liberal 





economic models would bring prosperity to all now seems like a bad joke to many who lost 
their jobs and livelihoods in the financial crises, especially when they see that those in the 
banking and finance industry who were responsible for the economic collapse got off lightly 
and, in some cases, even prospered from their unethical irresponsibility.  
This loss of faith in the authorities and trust in their expertise applies not just to politicians 
and government, bankers, and financiers but to many kinds of scientific, technical, academic, 
and educational experts and authorities. While the COVID-19 pandemic has swept across the 
globe and the only hope of limiting its catastrophic impact is through the guidance of 
epidemiologists and the remarkable research successes of those who produce vaccines and 
identify treatments, those groups of people who express their lack of trust in other authorities 
also refuse to wear masks and observe physical distancing, they are skeptical and even 
antagonistic to vaccination, and conspiracy theories run wild through their social networks.  
With trust in experts and elites gone, people have also found similar betrayals in those 
areas of social engagement with which they most easily identify, such as popular sports like 
football, and institutions that normally provide some of the social glue that keeps societies 
together in difficult times, including the churches and other religious organizations, have been 
exposed as infested with dishonesty, corruption, and the abuse of children and young people. 
Confidence in all these traditional structures and their leaderships is at a very low ebb and 
people are turning in large numbers to movements and leaders who express the anger and 
betrayal that they feel so strongly. It does not matter whether they believe all that such groups 
and leaders say. They do not necessarily read their manifestos and find themselves persuaded 
of new political theories. What appeals to them is that these leaders in their very personalities 
express the feelings of anger and betrayal with which many people identify strongly. There is 
a growth in nationalism and populism and an angry intolerance of difference that is now 
expressed by liberals almost as much as by conservatives. This development raises a question 
about whether it is in the nature of liberalism not to address anxiety, mistrust, and the negative 
emotions that people feel because it is such a rationalist philosophy, and so its failure when 
faced with such a picture is inevitable. This is an important question and I return to it later. 
What is clear is that the leaders of the old order, liberal and conservative, have lost confidence 
that they themselves really know how to address the challenges they face, and those who 
represent the expertise in governance, finance, science, and technology that has delivered 
extraordinary benefits in increased international trade and travel and huge progress in medicine, 
communication, and information technology have now lost much of the earlier, and justifiable, 
popular respect and trust in their integrity and judgment.  
Recent technological developments are often described as “disruptive.” For some this 
word has positive connotations, suggesting interruptions in the status quo and the opening up 
of new opportunities for change, while for others, possibly a majority, the welcome they give 
to particular new technologies, such as “smartphones,” is not reflected in an enthusiasm for all 
aspects of the new technology and its complicated personal, social, and ethical implications. 
When we are faced with such crisis and uncertainty, our natural reaction is to look to the 
experience of the past to see whether we can identify previous patterns that, while not repeated 
precisely, may nevertheless give us guidance. Some thinkers, troubled by the rise in political 
extremism, see resonances with the rise of fascism in the 1930s following on from the impact 
of the First World War, the influenza pandemic of 1918–1920, and later the Great Depression. 
They identify the financial and economic crises of 2008 as a trigger for the regression from 
liberal democracy to populism and authoritarianism. Other commentators see analogous 
developments in earlier periods or emphasize other drivers for their analyses. 
In trying to understand the dynamics of what has come to be called Brexit—the decision 
by the United Kingdom to disengage from the European Union—I have been reflecting on how 
we had a kind of Brexit five hundred years earlier when Henry VIII broke the link between the 





English Church and the rest of the Roman Catholic communion. At that time Europe was 
experiencing crises that had some characteristics similar to those of today. Among these was 
profound disenchantment with the Roman Catholic authorities that exerted control over the 
population in religious affairs (and there were no other substantial churches or religious 
authorities in the West) and in much of the secular world too. In 1517 a German monk called 
Martin Luther, believing that the Church leaders were corrupt, dishonest, misleading people 
about their faith, and untrustworthy on key issues of public and private life, issued a challenge 
in the form of ninety-five theses. Not only, however, did his theology challenge the authority 
of the Pope and the Church by its insistence on the priesthood of all believers and the 
responsibility of everyone to read the Bible and work out their own faith and relationship with 
God, but he followed it up by translating the Bible into the German vernacular. Because 
printing had become widely available with Gutenberg’s invention of the printing press in the 
mid-1400s, the content of Luther’s ideas and the Bible itself were now quickly available to 
large numbers of people in their own language. What was true for German speakers soon 
became true for others, with the result that right across Europe a ferment of ideas was generated, 
resulting in a fundamental shift of authority. Gutenberg’s new “disruptive” technology was 
first used for the printing of indulgences for the Church and the printing of the Bible in Latin—
a language that was not understood by many religious at the time, never mind the ordinary 
people. It was not long, however, before printing began to make the ideas of Luther, Calvin, 
and other reformers available for people to read for themselves, and the arguments became 
fierce about theology, liturgy, and church government and practices and also about the standing 
of the secular authorities. Soon the seat of authority in both faith and politics no longer lay with 
the bishops and princes who could no longer insist that they had the monopoly of interpretation 
of the world or the instruction of people on how life should be lived. In principle at least, every 
man had the freedom, the facility, and the responsibility to read and interpret the scriptures and 
an increasing amount of other literature for himself—though this freedom was not quite as 
complete as it was often declared to be. Coming at a time when there was profound unhappiness 
about corruption in the Church and frustration at religious and political authoritarianism, 
Luther’s intervention was like a spark to tinder. 
Today we do not think of printing as a “disruptive technology”; but in those days many of 
the bulwarks of society must have sat around their dinner tables discussing the profound 
dangers of this invention. They knew that people would develop all sorts of new ideas and the 
old certainties and the very stability of society were under threat. They were right to be 
concerned. The result of this disruption was violent conflict and an end of their position of 
unquestioned authority. Similarly, as we look around today, we see that new disruptive 
technologies abound; deep anger about the corruption seems endemic in authorities of all kinds, 
and they have lost the respect of their people. The result is political fragmentation. If we look 
back at what happened five hundred years ago, can we learn anything? What are the similarities 
and differences? 
In the first instance, men of science (and they were almost all men) like Galileo, Descartes, 
and Newton did not challenge specifically religious doctrine, but their observations 
emboldened them to question what the Church was teaching about the universe we inhabit. 
While some were able to avoid sanctions by the Church because of where they lived, others 
had a much more difficult time; but their healthy intellectual curiosity ensured that rather than 
simply accepting the traditional teachings of the Church about the world, they continued to 
explore it for themselves. 
Galileo Galilei was not only an acute observer; he also developed the use of instruments 
such as the telescope to improve the quality of his observations and conducted experiments to 
see whether his thinking and his mathematical calculations were borne out in practice. The 
thinking based on these experiments got him into trouble with the Church in his home country 





of Italy because his results challenged the received Church wisdom, especially in the field of 
astronomy, where, among other things, in his book Sidereus Nuncius (Starry Messenger), 
published in 1610, he put forward the proposition that the earth goes around the sun, rather 
than that the sun goes around the earth. The Polish polyglot Copernicus had already expressed 
this view but had died shortly after the publication of his book De revolutionibus orbium 
coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres) in 1543.7 
While Copernicus and Galileo were forced by their scientific observations and 
mathematical calculations to question the Church’s beliefs about the natural world, the 
Frenchman René Descartes, in his Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's 
Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences (1637), ventured into even more challenging 
territory. The Protestant Reformation had fundamentally altered the seat of authority. 
According to the reformers, every individual had the right and the responsibility to work 
matters out for themselves and Descartes was able to find freedom to develop his philosophical 
ideas by moving to the relative openness of the Protestant Netherlands, though even there his 
commitment to a rationalist approach to enquiry rather than accepting religious dogma led him 
into disputes with some of the Protestant theologians. He was determined not to appeal to God 
as the final cause for everything but instead he would “divide all the difficulties under 
examination into as many parts as possible, and as many as were required to solve them in the 
best way” and “conduct [his] thoughts in a given order, beginning with the simplest and most 
easily understood object, and gradually ascending, as it were step by step, to the knowledge of 
the most complex.” 
This mode of examination was applied to the mind and the body, to the mental and physical 
worlds, with both available for scientific exploration, though in different spheres. This 
separation of the two spheres enabled him and others to make enormous progress in 
understanding the physical world. His mathematical inquiries tended to reduce the higher and 
more complex phenomena to their constituent parts, without entirely appreciating what was 
lost in this reductionism. In exploring mental functioning, he also believed that the brain 
resembled a working machine and that mathematics and mechanics could explain the most 
complicated processes of the mind. By making this spilt between mind and body, he was able 
to move ahead while retaining a religious perspective. 
Isaac Newton, the greatest of the English scientists, took a similar approach. “Nature is 
extremely simple and conformable to herself,” Newton said. “Whatever reasoning holds for 
greater motions should hold for lesser ones as well.” In other words, he too seemed to believe 
that we can separate phenomena into their fundamental elements and so build up a complete 
understanding of the physical universe. It appears that having said that, he did understand that 
something else was going on. “I can calculate the motion of heavenly bodies, but not the 
madness of people,” he said, and he also conducted an extensive study of alchemy, presumably 
from an instinctive appreciation of the limits of the explanatory models with which he was 
working. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, some physicists who had continued 
to build on Newton’s scientific ideas were beginning to think that they had identified all the 
key laws and that, while there were still details to be worked out, the main principles were 
clear. 
Others were not convinced and things began to change quite dramatically in the early 
twentieth century, not least when in 1927 Werner Heisenberg made clear that absolute accuracy 
about some things simply wasn’t possible not just in practice because of the state of knowledge 
or technology but in principle because, as he said, “One cannot measure the exact values of the 
position and momentum of a particle at the same time.”8 
It was becoming apparent that in chaotic systems, even miniscule differences in 
measurements of initial position and momentum could result in huge errors of long-term 





predictions of these quantities—there was sensitive dependency on initial conditions and in a 
very fundamental way a degree of uncertainty that could not be removed. 
These developments in mathematics and physics linked up with politics, because 
eventually a significant development in one area of intellectual life affects all other areas and, 
more immediately, because governments were struggling even more than previously with the 
violent political conflict that was convulsing the world and they turned to scientists to apply 
their scientific understandings to the technology of warfare. Dramatic new opportunities for 
communication had been developed by Guglielmo Marconi, Samuel B. Morse, Alexander 
Graham Bell, and others, enabling messages to be communicated almost instantaneously across 
huge distances. At the same time, powered flight and new types of military vehicles, such as 
the tank, transformed warfare by bringing a step change in the destructive capacities and 
geographical range of operations. The race to be the first in the development of new 
technologies of warfare was mirrored by developments in civilian life with medicine, travel, 
communication, lifestyle, and political ideas all being hugely affected by the application of 
science. 
The scientific method was more difficult to apply to biology and the development of 
humanity; but with the evolutionary ideas of Darwin and the notion that we can break things 
down into their component parts and understand those, some scientists began to think of human 
relationships as being able to be reduced to an almost mechanical understanding of basic human 
functions, such as nourishment, sexuality, and aggression. Later generations continued to 
follow this reductionistic line, with people like Richard Dawkins seeing humanity as little more 
than what he described as “throwaway survival kits for genes.”9 It should not be surprising that 
the dissolution of boundaries and value systems was unsteadying. 
Others wondered, however, about the limitations of reductionism and linear thinking. 
Rather than reducing everything to its simplest elements, John Hughlings Jackson, the father 
of English neurology, looked through the telescope from the opposite end and pointed out that 
in human beings, individual maturation and development involves the emergence of new 
capacities. As reflexes are replaced by voluntary movements, there is increasing flexibility, 
adaptability, and complexity but by dint of that, less predictability. When that development is 
obstructed by illness or injury, the newer, higher, more adaptable functions are lost and the 
older more predictable, less complex functions return; but a natural process of healing then 
enables some return of higher functions. In his Croonian lectures in 1884, he applied these 
ideas of evolution and dissolution of the nervous system to physical development and to 
“mentation,” or the thinking function, and even described these as an analogy to governance, 
or the functioning of societies.10 His ideas were the basis for much of the approach that 
Sigmund Freud took in the development of psychoanalytic theory. Freud was working at a 
watershed period. Some of his thinking and that of his colleagues and successors tended to be 
reductionistic, describing our higher functions in somewhat hydraulic or mechanistic terms. At 
other times he seemed to suggest that the primitive mechanisms are only a foundation on which 
other more advanced defenses or transformations could build. At these times he seemed to be 
more focused on the development of emergent functions than on reducing complexity to simple 
functions. Another physician who tried with some success to recognize the emergence of new 
and complex capacities was the French evolutionary psychiatrist Henry Ey. His “neo-
Jacksonian” organo-dynamic theory tried to get over the Cartesian split between mind and body 
by incorporating the existentialism of people like Martin Heidegger into his ideas of the 
evolution and dissolution of personality and consciousness; his understanding of the latter was 
influenced by Heidegger’s notion of “being-in-the-world.” Ey appreciated that something 
radically new is created by the emergence of consciousness—the capacity to be aware of 
oneself and create in one’s mind a kind of theater in which one can observe the world in fantasy. 





To concentrate on the building blocks that provide the foundations of brain function does not 
enable us fully to understand this emergent phenomenon.11 
In the field of psychology, it was becoming clear that exploring how the individual 
functions requires an understanding of the larger and wider systems in which the individual 
operates. The individual with an eating disorder, for example, could not be successfully treated 
without taking the family into consideration and without bringing them into treatment in family 
therapy. Physicists were finding something similar. They could understand everything about 
hydrogen and everything about oxygen, but that understanding did not tell them what emergent 
properties to expect when they were brought together as water. Examining an individual 
molecule of water provided little understanding of the concept of “wetness.” Some of these 
physicists working at Los Alamos, where “the Bomb” had been developed, started to take their 
thinking about systems into exploring complex adaptive systems. With greater complexity, 
new phenomena emerged through theoretical developments in higher mathematics that took 
them beyond linear thinking and were confirmed in practice. 
They set up a new center, the Santa Fe Institute, which became the world center for the 
study of complexity science. The work there has clarified that in reductionism not only 
structure and organization but information is lost. Breaking things down into their constituent 
parts illuminates some things, but it can miss others. It may seem that we have strayed a long 
way from the challenge of understanding the dangerous developments in our global village, so 
let us return to see why these discoveries are relevant and important. 
While the key events of today, the development of disruptive technologies, the appearance 
of widespread corruption, the loss of respect for authority with resultant instability and violence 
in society has some precedents in the 1500s, at that point the reformers had a very clear and 
progressive agenda. They wanted to replace the authorities that were standing in the way of 
intellectual development with a more liberal democratic order that would facilitate new, critical 
ideas and thinking, scientific exploration of all kinds, and a new economic and political order 
with new ways of creating and distributing wealth. It is more difficult to see what the reform 
agenda is today, for those who have adopted “disruption” as their modus operandi. They seem 
to believe that to destroy the current structures and elite will, in itself, bring about a better 
future; but as René Girard points out, it may simply bring chaos and violence.12 
My own experience of trying to resolve the apparently intractable problem of political 
violence in Ireland and bring about a new and better future led to a very different perspective 
from that of “the disruptors” in the terrorist organizations. After hundreds of years of attempts 
by England to dominate Ireland, punctuated by recurrent violent rebellions, finally in 1921 
most of the island succeeded in achieving independence. The reason this did not include the 
whole island was that the people of Ireland were divided on the future they wanted to see. The 
majority in the northern part of the island had a different sense of identity and allegiance from 
the rest of the people of Ireland. They were pro-British and Protestant, and they wished to 
remain part of the United Kingdom. A thirty-year terrorist campaign between 1967 and 1998 
failed to break their spirit or disrupt the connection, and the violence was finally ended by the 
historic Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. This agreement and the process that led to it were 
unique because a long process of engagement was undertaken to bring the violence to a 
permanent end through analyzing and exploring all the key sets of disturbed historic 
relationships.  
The foundation for this process was two-fold—first, the practical example of the European 
project that enabled historic enemies, Germany and France, to find new and peaceful ways of 
relating to each other, and second, the acceptance of the liberal pluralism best described by the 
philosopher Isaiah Berlin. He maintained that since we have the possibility of choice and 
different individuals and communities will have differing views about what is a good future, if 
one side is not to be repressed and the other dominant, a pluralist outcome will be required.13 





For Protestant unionists, the clear wish was to remain within the United Kingdom, while 
Catholic nationalists wanted to leave the United Kingdom. Whereas nationalist disruption 
through a long-running terrorist campaign had failed to sufficiently disrupt the state, repression 
of the nationalist aspiration by unionism had also proved to be impossible. The three key sets 
of relationships that emerged from the initial explorations were between Protestant unionists 
and Catholic nationalists in Northern Ireland, between the people in the North and the people 
in the South, and between Britain and Ireland. Thus, a three-stranded process was created that 
involved the relevant political representatives of these three sets of relationships and when an 
agreement was reached, it addressed all three sets of relationships with interlocking institutions. 
While one could address each set of relationships separately and one could explore the 
various socioeconomic problems, and also policing and the administration of justice, political 
identity and control, religious affiliation and culture, history and geography, none of these 
issues on their own was an explanation for the intractability of the conflict, and any engagement 
with one impacted the dynamics of all the others. All these relationships and issues had to be 
addressed in the same process. This was a complex adaptive system in which every intervention 
impacted every other element and any resolution had to engage the whole system. The 
application of systems theory to psychological problems in the 1970s had resulted in the 
development of new approaches to treatment, such as family therapy in which a whole family 
group was brought into sessions at one time to address the network of relevant connections and 
relationships, rather than only the individual identified patient. In an analogous way, when we 
started to think about developing the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, we realized that we 
needed to respect the importance of the complex system of historic relationships involving 
Britain and Ireland and every section of the community had to be involved in negotiating the 
agreement. 
In the years after the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, problems arose every time one 
or more of these relationships were taken for granted. The British-Irish Inter-Governmental 
Conference that was to maintain and sustain the London-Dublin relationship did not meet at 
the top level for a decade, and so when the issue of Brexit arose there was no working 
relationship between the political leaderships of the British and Irish governments. The absence 
of such a relationship not only created problems in Northern Ireland but also proved to be very 
problematic for the British government in its attempts to negotiate a Brexit agreement with the 
European Union and for the Irish government as it found its political and economic stability 
under threat. The process of negotiating the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement and the 
problems that have arisen since are a demonstration of the centrality of relationships in such a 
complex adaptive system. A mechanical device is designed, built, and operated, and, especially 
if it is a complicated device with many parts, it may break down and it will not repair itself. 
The offending piece must be repaired or replaced, and then the mechanism can return to its 
previous way of operating. The mechanism is complicated, but it is not complex. Social 
systems are complex. A malfunctioning part of a social system will trigger attempts in the 
remaining parts of the system to continue functioning, though in a different way. This resilience 
of social systems is an example of the self-organizing capacity of a complex adaptive system.14 
The Irish experience also adopted what one might understand as complexity thinking in 
understanding terrorism. When an “ordinary” crime is committed, the police and the justice 
system attempt to gather evidence, identify a suspect, build their legal case, and prosecute the 
individual or small group of individuals concerned. It is a linear process. The criminal 
meantime, whose motivation is usually some form of personal gain, will try to hide his 
involvement, and for him it is a disaster if he is caught and convicted. The terrorist, however, 
is part of a larger cohort with an agenda that does not involve personal gain and the victim who 
is attacked is not the target of their attack. Instead, the triangularity of the process is such that 
they attack a victim and make public that it is they who have conducted the attack in order to 





undermine the government or responsible authorities, who are their real target. While they 
know that they are breaking the law, they see their actions as justified by a higher morality 
where they are defending the culture or identity of their people. Even their own survival is not 
as important as the well-being of their cause for which they will make costly sacrifices.15 They 
are prepared to kill and to die for the sake of the cause, and they do not regard their death in 
the course of their terrorism as a catastrophe as long as the cause to which they are devoted 
continues to progress. In such a situation the normal, linear, individualized legal process is of 
limited value because dealing with an individual terrorist rarely has much impact unless that 
person is a key leader, and even then, the group can often find a successor. Dealing with such 
a problem involves understanding and addressing the cause for which a whole group or 
community of people is prepared to fight and die, and so it is a systemic rather than an 
individual or linear challenge. Terrorism, as described by Vamik Volkan, is not a matter of 
individual psychopathology but a phenomenon of “large group psychology.”16 
The same analysis can be applied to the terrorist violence of the radical Islamists and the 
“alt-right,” extreme right, or white supremacist movements. They see themselves as fighting, 
not on their own behalf but as part of a group or community that they believe to be under threat, 
to have been treated unfairly, humiliated, and disrespected, and to have been unable 
successfully to resolve these toxic experiences through peaceful democratic processes. They 
are fully aware that their actions are seen under the law as criminal acts, but they believe 
themselves to be serving a higher morality—the protection of their community from existential 
threat. Even those who operate as “lone wolves” almost always identify with a larger group or 
community. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) were extreme nationalists with a relatively 
simple political agenda—independence and unity for Ireland—and this is also largely true of 
some Islamist groups such as Hamas. Other more radical Islamists, such as Al Qaeda, the 
Islamic State, and their various associated networks, are, like the white supremacists, 
transnational networks with a wider and less specific agenda though driven by similar concerns 
and emotions but arguably representing the more profound deterioration in the global system 
to which I have referred. It is still true, however, that if we examine these terrorist phenomena 
not as the actions of a large number of disconnected, self-aggrandizing criminal individuals or 
small groups of discontented and disturbed people but rather as complex large group 
phenomena, we might improve our understanding and effectiveness. In trying to understand 
the functioning of a murmuration of starlings we do not seek to identify which is the leader for 
we know that no such individual bird exists. These flocks of birds are not led by one or more 
leaders, nor are they merely a collection of individual birds. They are functioning as a system. 
Exploring networks of violent actors as large group phenomena, rather than the individual 
actions of many troublesome individuals, would assist our analysis and help us understand 
better how to address the problems. But the challenge of moving to a new and different 
paradigm is significant. 
First, it is not easy to maintain a new and nonpartisan way of thinking. I was struck by 
how when the British prime minister Tony Blair, who had been deeply involved in the Irish 
Peace Process (a process he did not create but inherited from his predecessor, John Major), 
subsequently engaged in the Middle East problems with Israel and Palestine, he seemed to 
entirely forget all the lessons learned about understanding the complex sets of historic 
relationships involved. His behavior demonstrates the powerful tendency we have to regress to 
previous ways of thinking and functioning when we move to a new problem, and especially 
when we confront a challenging and polarized situation where the pressure to identify with one 
side or the other is very strong. But once one starts to identify with one side or the other, one 
has simply become part of the problem. The only way beyond this is to seek to understand the 
problem as located not in the aims or actions of one or other side but in the disturbance of the 
relationship between the two (or more) sides, now and in the past. 





In addition, though a shift of thinking and functioning is required, the social structures that 
were constructed on the old way of operating will strongly resist any attempted shift. The 
Reformation triggered the Counter-Reformation. Those who have benefited from or come to 
power in the old system, or have simply become comfortable or used to it, will strongly and 
often violently resist change. They will use every intellectual argument, economic pressure, 
political hurdle, and religious, cultural, or legal obstacle to resist the change, and, of course, in 
many instances this is not only psychologically understandable but perfectly reasonable for 
those who will lose out as individuals or communities from the change. 
Second, part of the complexity, and certainly a key element in relationships, is the affective 
component. The Enlightenment focused on reason as the key to progress, and rationality 
certainly has a primary role in our functioning as human beings. But we function as emotional 
beings too. Goethe and others were quick to point out that how we think has affective and other 
complex and nonrational components. Those who come from an Enlightenment perspective 
have tended to regard “feelings” as failings to be overcome in the service of rationality; but it 
is becoming increasingly clear that the nonrational components of our make-up have also been 
essential to our evolutionary success as human beings. In his most recent book, on cognitive 
biases in strategic instincts, Dominic Johnson sets out how cognitive biases can result not in 
catastrophic defeats but in remarkable successes.17 He gives the example of George 
Washington, who, on any objective evaluation of military strengths and weakness, ought to 
have been soundly defeated but refused to accept setbacks and ultimately achieved a historic 
victory and independence from Britain. 
These observations by Johnson offer some profoundly important messages to progressive 
thought and political liberalism. Successful ideologies and organizations, like complex 
adaptive systems, survive because they can evolve and adapt. In a few short years we have 
gone from Fukuyama and liberal democracy as the end of history to a widespread view that 
history may be watching the beginning of the end of liberal democracy. This is evidenced by 
opinion polls that show that increasing numbers of young people in the West are disenchanted 
with democratic politics. Globally we see the rise of authoritarian leaders who intend to govern 
for the foreseeable future without the inconvenience of free and fair elections and term limits. 
Can liberalism evolve and adapt to this challenging political and cultural climate? 
If we take seriously the increasing disenchantment with “expertise,” the loss of faith in 
authorities and experts, and the rise of nationalism and populism; if we appreciate that there is 
justifiable anger about widespread corruption and frustration with unfairness, broken promises, 
and the undeliverable prospectus of equality; if we focus on fairness, cooperation, community, 
and a radical new way of understanding based on complexity theories and science, will it bring 
peace, stability, and prosperity? We cannot be sure; indeed, one of the key insights of 
complexity science is that the resilience of systems brings outcomes that are not predictable. 
In the short term, whatever we do, we may be facing profound disruption. But when individual 
patients present with various pathological defenses, the psychological psychiatrist will not only 
try to find the anxieties or other feelings that underly and lead to the disturbance of thinking 
and behavior. He or she will also explore the key relationships of the patient and try to 
understand how far the disturbances of the individual who has presented are a function of 
systemic disturbances of the network of relationships of which they are “the presenting node.” 
We live in an age of anxiety, but this is not just about my personal anxieties. Since the bombs 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have all lived with unprecedented and growing threats to the 
very survival of humanity because we now have the capacity to destroy all human life on the 
planet. Two generations later we have additional well-founded public anxiety about threats to 
the life we know from large and rapid changes in technology, rapid population movements and 
consequent cultural pressures, and the existential threat of climate catastrophe. This anxiety, 
which we all share, results in regression not only to the past but also to a fundamentalist way 





of thinking in the community as well as in individuals. There is also increasing anger about the 
disrespect and unfairness that many people feel, and while anxiety may likely result in 
regression in the form of thinking, extreme anger can result in violence if there is no peaceful 
route to its resolution. Such dissolution of ordered relationships results in loss of complexity, 
a return to the past, fusion with the group as opposed to the other, and thinking based on being 
a “devoted actor” committed to a very different set of non-negotiable values that may involve 
costly and even fatal sacrifices for ourselves and others. 
Can we evolve and adapt in the face of such pressures, moving forward and pursuing a 
more cooperative “way of being”? 
The first step is to appreciate that liberalism must move beyond being concerned only 
about individual liberty for some, rather than about freedom of choice for all—including those 
with whom I disagree. This requires a pluralist form of governance not because every opinion 
or choice is as good as any other but because I have no defense against the person who believes 
that their truth can be imposed on me, if I act in that way toward them. If I am to be free to 
make my choices, then I must be prepared to negotiate the creation of a society where those 
who have a different perspective from me not only believe but also feel that they are being 
taken seriously and treated fairly and respectfully, as individuals and as communities. 
Liberalism is not just about liberty. It is also about liberality—a generosity of spirit that 
empathizes with and is concerned for those who feel disadvantaged, left out, or marginalized. 
This attitude, however, must be honest and believable. A prospectus that declares that everyone 
is equal is simply not believable because it is manifestly clear that human beings are not equal 
and will never be equal. Ensuring fairness is an entirely different and deliverable commitment, 
and all the intractable conflicts that I have examined involve communities of people who feel 
deeply disrespected and believe themselves to have been treated profoundly unfairly. 
If we can expand our perspective beyond the “rational individual actor” to create caring 
and cooperative “ways-of-being” in community without losing our concern for the individual, 
to be informed by rationality but also by emotions, basing our understanding on external reality 
but also appreciating wishes, fears, and creativity, appreciating the lessons of history and 
understanding the complexity of “large group” relations, then we may be able to rebuild our 
resilience as a human race. 
The old forms are dissolving, and we must look to the emergence of a new paradigm. 
Perhaps these three elements—the emergence of complexity science, the appreciation that our 
emotions are a positive evolutionary advantage rather than a flaw to be overcome, and a focus 
on the significance of relationships rather than simply on individuals themselves—may point 
toward a path for survival and our next evolutionary way station. We cannot be sure that this 
will be a successful way forward, but if we do not venture out, we will not find a new path. 
Exploration requires that we make the dangerous journey and we will come at length to a 
wholly new place only if we take the risk of leaving where we are, with all the risks that have 
attended the explorer in every generation. We know that complexity makes for greater 
unpredictability and while that itself produces anxiety, it seems it is also necessary if we are to 
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